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Dollars & Renminbis: Curbing the United
States' Raging Trade Deficit with China by
Dismantling the Dollar-Rmb Peg
Tricia D. Goldbum*
I.

The Surging U.S. Trade Imbalance with China

The U.S.-China trade deficit' has exploded. Between 1985 and
November 2006,2 the U.S. Department of Commerce reported that the
bilateral deficit soared from a negligible $6 million to an unprecedented
$213.6 billion. 3 Currently, America's most lopsided trade shortfall is
with China.4 Propelling the disparity is that over the same time period,
Chinese imports into the United States steadily exceeded American
exports to the Asian country by more than $1.2 trillion.5 In 2006 alone,
Chinese goods totaled $263.6 billion of the $1.7 trillion cumulative U.S.
imports, while American goods to China amounted to a mere $50.billion
of the $947.9 billion aggregate U.S. exports.6 China is the United States'
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2007; B.S., Albertus Magnus College, 2004.
1. Unless noted otherwise, the discussion in this Comment refers exclusively to the
goods trade between the United States and China on a U.S. Census basis. Research for
this Comment concluded on January 30, 2006, except to update statistical information
from the U.S. Department of Commerce.
2. Data for November 2006 is the most recent information currently available from
the U.S. Department of Commerce. All references to 2006 are up to that period.
3. Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance) with China,
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2006 (last visited Jan. 20,
2007) [hereinafter Trade in Goods]. In 1985, the cumulative American exports numbered
$3,855.7 million while Chinese imports measured $3,861.7 million. As of November
2006, the aggregate Chinese imports grew to $263.6 billion, but American exports
increased to only $50 billion. Id. (Calculations may be slightly off due to rounding.).
4. See Top Trading Partners-Total Trade, Exports, Imports, November 2006,
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statisticsthighlights/toppartners.htm
(last visited
Jan. 20, 2007) (hereinafter Top Trading Partners]. As of November 2006, China replaced
Mexico as the United States' second largest trading partner. Id.
5. See Trade in Goods, supra note 3. The number of imports exceeded that of
American exports for each year during that time span. Id.
6. Top Trading Partners, supra note 4. Trade with China measured 11.8% of total
U.S. trade. Id.
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second largest trading partner; its second-ranked source for imports; and
its fourth biggest export market.7
Undoubtedly, the United States benefits from its trade relationship
with China. Official capital inflow (investments in American assets by
foreign governments) 8 from the Asian nation, due to China's seemingly
insatiable appetite for American assets, helps to keep U.S. interest rates
low. 9 Likewise, substantial official capital inflow-primarily used to
purchase U.S. treasury and agency securities'--subsidizes the rapidly
accelerating federal budget deficit and retards the adverse effects of
declining personal-savings rates." The massive incursion of Chinese
imports into the U.S. markets1 2 results in more choices and lower prices
for American consumers,' 3 thereby increasing their real income 14 and
strengthening their purchasing power.' 5 Because consumption and not
production often reflects the economic wellbeing of a State, 16 the
bolstered position of the American consumer perpetuates the notion of a
robust U.S. economy.
In spite of those benefits, the news is not wholly optimistic. China's
practice of affixing its currency, the renminbi 17 ("Rmb"), to the U.S.
8
dollar creates an unfair competitive advantage for the Asian country.'
7. Id. Canada leads China as the United States' largest trading partner and import
market. Canada, Mexico, and Japan rank higher than China for exports. Id.
8. Marc Labonte & Gail Makinen, CRS Report for Congress, Changing Causes of
the U.S. Trade Deficit, at 1 (2005).
9. Wayne M. Morrison & Marc Labonte, CRS Report for Congress, China's
Currency Peg: A Summary of the Economic Issues, at 4 (2005).
10. See Leslie P. Norton, What's Behind the Debate Over China's Currency,
BARRON'S, July 28, 2003, at MW8.
11. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 9, at 4-5.
12. In 2005, imports from China accounted for more than three-quarters of the
imported consumer goods. Christopher L. Bach, US. International Transactions in
2005, at 31-32 (Apr. 2006), http://www.bea.gov/bea/ARTICLES/2006/04April/
0406_ITA.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
13. Bill Thomas, Chairman, House Committee on Ways & Means, U.S. Trade
Deficit
with
China:
An
Economy-Wide
View
(Apr.
2005),
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/trade/chinatradedeficit.pdf (last visited Jan.
20, 2007).
14. Id.
15. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 9, at 4.
16. Id.
17. The official People's currency is the renminbi ("Rmb"), and the yuan is its unit
of account. Rmb refers to China's currency as in the U.S. dollar. Yuan refers to amounts
(as in $5) or circulating notes (for instance, a $10 bill). Many economists and financial
analysts use the words interchangeably. Joint Economic Committee, PRC's Pegged
Exchange Rate Contributes to Global Imbalances, at 26 n. 1 (2005), www.house.gov/jec/
publications/109/prc05-25-05.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) [hereinafter PRC's Pegged
Exchange].
18. Jonathan E. Sanford, CRS Report for Congress, China's Currency: Brief
Overview of U.S. Options, at 2 (2005).
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Since January 1994, the People's Bank of China ("People's Bank" or
"PBOC") has maintained a relatively immobile exchange rate between
the two currencies. 19 Consequently, the Rmb's value is lower than it
would be if it were determined by supply and demand or freely floated
on the global currency market. 20 A result of that practice is that Chinese
exports enter international markets at significantly low prices, 2 1 while
foreign imports, including American goods, enter China's domestic
markets at much higher costs. 22 In light of that outcome and other
economic concerns, the U.S. must regain control of its trade deficit with
China. As a first step, the United States should act to disband the
currency arrangement implemented by the People's Bank.
This Comment advocates challenging the currency peg before the
Dispute Resolution Panel of the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
Part II presents an historical synopsis of the trade relationship between
the countries. Part III explains the nexus between the two currencies and
highlights some of the economic consequences that the currency
arrangement has on the two countries. Part IV discusses the U.S.
reaction to the currency arrangement. Part V explores proposals that
have been proffered for dealing with the peg and investigates the
potential consequence of each; the section culminates with the course of
action that the U.S. should pursue. The resolution sought from the WTO
enables an equitable arrangement between the two currencies. It allows
China to conform to certain obligations under international protocols,
namely those of the WTO and the International Monetary Fund. Finally,
the resolution, acknowledging the economic repercussions of an upward
revaluation of the Rmb, strives for an outcome that protects both the U.S.
and Chinese economies. Part VI concludes the Comment.
Although, this Comment strongly advocates revaluing the Rmb as
an immediate solution to the U.S.-China trade deficit, it does not imply
that a revalued Rmb is the exclusive remedy. The bilateral trade
imbalance is attributable to several causes. This Comment asserts that
the relationship between the two currencies is the chief agitator.
Accordingly, if U.S. officials are genuinely motivated to correct the
lopsided trade deficit with China, they must first act to dislodge the
dollar-Rmb peg.
II.

The Evolution of the Sino-American Trade Relationship
The United States and China share a lengthy trading history. That
19.

PRC's PeggedExchange, supra note 17, at 27 n. 11.

20.
21.
22.

Morrison & Labonte, supra note 9, at 3.
See id. at 2.
Id.
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relationship, however, is rarely without controversy. For a time, it was
nonexistent due to China's embrace of communist philosophy. In spite
of that allegiance persisting, the countries' trade partnership has grown
steadily since its resumption in the early 1980s.
A.

Normal Trade Relations

Before 1951, the U.S. conducted trade with China pursuant to a
statutory grant.23 The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934,24
sought to liberalize U.S. trade 25 by authorizing the president to negotiate
bilateral agreements with foreign nations.26 Those agreements alleviated
duties and other import restrictions,27 and elevated the United States'
trading partners to most-favored nation 28 or normal trade relations
("NTR") 29 status. China maintained that standing with the U.S. until
September 1, 1951, when President Harry S Truman revoked it. 30 In
accordance with the newly enacted Section 5 of the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 195 1,31 President Truman suspended all trade with the
Soviet Union and a majority 32 of the Sino-Soviet bloc regions33 and
countries,3 4 including China.35 It was not until February 1, 1980 that the
two countries resumed their trade relationship.36 At that time, China
remained a nonmarket economy; 37 therefore, its NTR standing could
23. Vladimir N. Pregeij, CRS Report for Congress, Most-Favored-Nation Status of
the People's Republic of China, at 1 (2001).
24. 19 U.S.C. § 2136 (1998).
25. See generally id.
26. Pregelj, supra note 23, at 2-3.
27. 19 U.S.C. § 2136 (1998).
28. Vladimir N. Pregelj, CRS Report for Congress, Normal-Trade-Relations (MostFavored-Nation)Policy of the United States, at What is Normal-Trade-Relations (MostFavored-Nation) Treatment? (2000).
29. In 1998, Congress officially changed the designation of most-favor nation to
normal trade relations to refer to nondiscriminatory tariff treatment. 19 U.S.C. § 2481(9)
(1998).
30. Pregelj, supra note 23, at 1.
31. Pregelj, supra note 28, at U.S. Most-Favored-Nation Policy.
32. Yugoslavia's NTR status was not withdrawn. However, countries and regions
that lost NTR standing included: Albania, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Indochina (communist dominated areas of Cambodia, Laos,
and Vietnam), Korea, Kurile Islands, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, Poland and its
communist-controlled areas (which was restored in 1960), Rumania, Southern Sakhalin
Island, Soviet Union, Tanna Tuva, and Tibet. Pregelj, supra note 28, at U.S. MostFavored-Nation Policy.
33. Id.
34. Pregelj, supra note 23, at 1.
35. Pregelj, supra note 28, at U.S. Most-Favored-Nation Policy.
36. See Wayne M. Morrison, CRS Report for Congress, China-US. Trade Issues, at
The Relationship Between China's NTR Status and WTO Accession (2001).
37. "In general[,] the term 'nonmarket economy country' means any foreign country
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only be reinstated pursuant to Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 ("1974
Act"). 38
The 1974 Act restored China's NTR status temporarily and
contingent upon certain renewal provisions. 39 The first of those
conditions was an agreement between the two countries stipulating
mutual and nondiscriminatory tariff treatment.40 Initially, the renewed
NTR extended for three years.4
Thereafter, it was renewable
4
2
triennially if the president ensured that "a satisfactory balance of
concessions in trade and services [had] been maintained during the life of
[the] agreement, and ...that actual or foreseeable reductions in [U.S.]
tariff and nontariff barriers to trade resulting from multilateral
negotiations [were] satisfactorily reciprocated by [China]."'4

Congress

retained its authority to reject, by joint resolution, the initial agreement
and any subsequent extensions. 44
The second provision of NTR restoration required China's
compliance with the freedom of emigration mandate 45 of the so-called
Jackson-Vanik Amendment ("J-V Amendment").4 6 Under the 1974 Act,
however, the president could waive that requirement by executive
order.47 To do so, the president must report to Congress that such a
waiver substantially promoted the J-V Amendment's objectives, and
China's emigration policies did not contravene the purpose of the J-V
Amendment. 48 As with the underlying trade agreement, the second
49
stipulation was renewable subject to congressional approval.
50
basis.
annual
an
Subsequent extensions though were granted on
For the most part, China's NTR standing remained unchallenged
until 1989. ' After the Tiananmen Square tragedy,5 2 several members of
Congress sought on repeated occasions to tie China's NTR status to the
that the administering authority determines does not operate on market principles of cost
or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair
value of the merchandise." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (1996).
38. Pregelj, supra note 23, at 1; see generally 19 U.S.C. 2431(1975).
39. Pregelj, supra note 23, at 1.
40. 19 U.S.C. § 2435(a) (1990).
41. 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(1) (1990).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2435(c) (1990).
45. Pregelj, supra note 23, at 2.
46. 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1998).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 2432(c) (1998).
48. 19 U.S.C. § 2432(c)(1) (1998).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 2432(d)(1)(c) (1998).
50. 19 U.S.C. § 2432(d)(1) (1998).
51. Morrison, supra note 36, at The Relationship Between China's NTR Status and
WTO Accession.
52. Id.
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country's human rights record, weapons proliferation, Taiwan security,
and protection of intellectual property rights.53 None of those efforts,
however, was successful. 54
B.

PermanentNormal Trade Relations

On November 15, 1999, the two countries entered into a new
agreement ("1999 Agreement").55 Under that accord, China conceded to
eliminating trade barriers on services, agriculture, and industry goods 56 in
exchange for President William J. Clinton's advocacy for permanent
NTR ("PNTR") and World Trade Organization ("WTO") membership.57
President Clinton, along with other supporters of PNTR legislation,
urged that PNTR with China was critical to American interests. 58 They
proffered that without PNTR status if the Asian nation were admitted to
the WTO, U.S. firms would not benefit from the trade concessions made
in China's accession agreement.5 9 Moreover, PNTR would make the
Chinese domestic markets more accessible to American companies, 60 and
the United States could avail itself of the WTO's dispute resolution
procedure to settle trade disagreements that may arise between the two
nations. 61 Opposition against the PNTR legislation cited the 1999
Agreement's failure to prevent low-cost Chinese goods from inundating
U.S. markets62 and injuring the domestic labor force.6 3
Despite the opposition, legislation granting China PNTR status was
enacted in October 200064 with specific safeguards to allay some of the
concerns raised.6 5 Congress established a commission to monitor and
report trends in China's policies that were threatening to U.S. interests.66
An allowance to implement anti-surge mechanisms should the U.S.

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Sean D. Murphy, ed., U.S. Enacts Law on Normalizing Trade Relations with
China, 95 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 145, 145 (No. 1 2001).

56. Wayne M. Morrison, CRS Report for Congress, China and the World Trade
Organization,at Summary (2001).
57. Murphy, supra note 55, at 145. If China were granted PNTR status, the country
would no longer be required to submit to the trade renewal procedures of Title IV of the
Trade Act of 1974. Pregelj, supra note 23, at 12.
58. Morrison, supra note 36, at The Relationship Between China's NTR Status and
WTO Accession.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Murphy, supra note 55, at 146.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also 114 Stat. 881 (2000).
65. 114 Stat. 881 (2000).
66. 22 U.S.C. § 7002 (2005).
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determine that disruptions in its domestic markets would result from a
deluge of Chinese imports was also included.6 7 Moreover, the president
was required to certify to Congress that any compact executed with
China promoting that country's accession to the WTO would embody the
terms and conditions of the 1999 Agreement.68 Finally, China's PNTR
status became effective only if the Asian nation were accepted into the
WTO.69
C.

World Trade OrganizationPartners

After fifteen years of intense negotiations, the WTO admitted China
on December 11, 2001 .70 The new WTO standing was important to the
Asian nation for several reasons. First, it guaranteed China PNTR status
with the U.S.71 Second, membership acknowledged that the Asian nation
was an emerging economic giant around the world.72 Third, the Chinese
government could participate in the creation of any new trade rules
governing WTO trading partners.7 3 Fourth, membership allowed China
to avail itself of the WTO's dispute resolution process, which eliminated
74
exposure to threats of import restrictions against Chinese exports.
Similarly, China's acceptance into the WTO was advantageous for
its existing and new trading partners. Like all other members of the
international body, China had to disclose the intricacies of its trade
regime to the WTO's Working Party. 5 Member states desiring access to
China's domestic market could negotiate, freely and independently,
bilateral agreements for trade concessions and commitments.7 6 In
addition to those individual accords, China had to come to terms with the
WTO's Working Party regarding the rules that were to govern the
country's trade practices.77
The U.S. grant of PNTR status was the principal indicator of the
American position regarding China's WTO accession. 78 Trade analysts

67. Murphy, supra note 55, at 146.
68. 114 Stat. 881 (2000).
69. Id.
70. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Background Information on
China's Accession to the World Trade Organization, (Dec. 11, 2001),
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/FactSheets/2001/SectionIndex.html
(last
visited Jan. 20, 2007) [hereinafter China'sAccession to the WTO].
71. Morrison, supra note 56, at China's Interest in WTO Membership.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. China'sAccession to the WTO, supra note 70.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Morrison, supra note 56, at The Role and Interest of the United States.
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in the United States posited that the Asian country's rapidly expanding
79
economy was a promising market for a variety of American exports.
The U.S. used its prominent role in the WTO to assist in China's
accession premised upon America's understanding that membership
would suppress Chinese restrictions on imports into its domestic market;
it would open the Asian nation's trade regime to international scrutiny;
and it would afford 80 foreign companies the same treatment as their
Chinese counterparts.
D.

The Characterof the Goods Traded

The nature of the goods traded between the two countries is very
distinct. United States' imports from China comprise inexpensive
consumer products, such as low-priced apparel and footwear, toys,
sporting equipment, and consumer electronics.81 China, on the other
hand, imports more expensive and technologically advanced American
products,
including
aircraft
and
transportation
equipment,
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, semiconductors, and computer
software.82
Several major U.S. corporations 83 invest in China by
84
relocating their manufacturing or research and development operations
to take advantage of the low-cost Chinese workforce.8 5 Presently, the
U.S. is China's third largest foreign direct investor, ranking only behind
Hong Kong and Taiwan.86
The composition of the goods exchange encourages proponents of
87
continued trade to reject concerns about the bilateral trade deficit.
They assert that Chinese exports do not replace goods commonly
manufactured in the U.S. 88 In fact, ninety percent of the Chinese
products imported into the U.S. directly substitutes goods from other
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Businessroundtable.org, The U.S. Bilateral Trade Deficit with China is not a
Sign of U.S. Economic Weakness, http://trade.businessroundtable.org/trade_2005/
china/trade deficit.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
82. Id.
83. Corporations include the Ford Motor Company, General Electric, and General
Motors among others. See Morrison, supra note 36, at China's Economy.
84. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, U.S.-China
Commission Cites Troubling Trends for U.S. Economic and National Security Interest.
Details Year-Long Studies and Offers Numerous Recommendations in Annual Report to
Congress, (Jun. 15, 2004), http://www.uscc.gov (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
85. See Morrison & Labonte, supra note 9, at 6.
86. Morrison, supra note 36, at China's Economy.
87. See generally Businessroundtable.org, supra note 81.
88. The U.S.-China Business Council, Understanding the U.S.-China Balance of
Trade, (Aug. 3, 2004), http://www.uschina.org/statistics/2004balanceoftrade.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2007) [hereinafter U.S.-ChinaBalance of Trade].
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low-wage Eastern and Southeastern Asian economies. 89 Their criticisms
also cite deficiencies in the U.S. Department of Commerce's method of
calculating the imbalance. Firstly, they contend that exclusion of the
entrep6t trade 9° through Hong Kong deflates the amount of U.S. exports
to China by as much as thirteen percent. 91 Secondly, the reported
imbalance does not account for costs related to freight, insurance, and
loading. 92 Accordingly, if those costs were incorporated, the value of
U.S. exports would increase by one percent and imports would decrease
by as much as ten percent.9 3
More importantly, the supporters proffer that the trade deficit is
indicative of the strength of the American consumers' purchasing power
relative to the purchasing power of their Chinese counterparts.9 4 Hence,
the correlation between the bilateral trade deficit and U.S. economic
growth should be considered a benefit. 95 That is to say, a decline in the
deficit would slow the United States' economy and vice versa.96 As
evidence of those assertions, proponents point to the U.S.' trade deficits
with Canada and Mexico despite America's unbridled access to those
markets created by the North American Free Trade Agreement. 97 Other
economic analysts,9 8 however, caution that the trend in the deficit should
be of concern because it is symptomatic of China's restrictive trade and
investment practices. 99
III. China's Managed-Currency RegimeO° °
The People's Bank issues and controls the Rmb exclusively;' 0 it
determines the currency's exchange rate, which the State Administration
of Exchange Control supervises, under direct governance of the
89.

Id.

90. Entrep6t trade means goods shipped from one economy to another via a thirdparty economy after additional processing or assembly. Id.
91. Id.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.

94.
95.
96.

See Businessroundtable.org, supra note 81.
See generally id.
See id.
Id.

97.
98.

Morrison, supra note 36, at Summary.

99. Id.
100. See Edmund L. Andrews, China's Currency Shift: In Washington; China Floats
FreeFrom the Dollar,N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2005, at Cl. See also International Monetary
Fund, De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Policy
Framework, http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/mfd/er/2005/eng/1205.htm

(last visited Jan.

27, 2007) (classifying the People's Bank currency exchange rate regime as a currency
board arrangement).
The Renminbi and Foreign Exchange Rate Control,
China.org.cn,
101.
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/38255.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:3

PBOC. 10 2 In 1974, the Rmb's exchange rate was pegged to an
undisclosed fifteen-currency basket against which its daily value
remained static. 10 3 The People's Bank, however, abandoned that scheme
in the early 1980s. 10 4 Over the years, the exchange rate regime
underwent a series of modifications, 10 5 including a divergence of the
the PBOC
official exchange and market swap rates. 10 6 In January 1994,
10 7
unified the dual-rate scheme and affixed it to the U.S. dollar.
A.

The Anatomy of the Dollar-Rmb Peg

To maintain the dollar-Rmb peg, the People's Bank established a
reference exchange rate between the two currencies. 1 8 At its institution,
that rate was about 8.28 Rmb to the U.S. dollar.10 9 Additionally, the
PBOC created a trading band of approximately 0.3% within which the
reference exchange rate would vacillate. 10 Consequently, on any given
trading day, the Rmb's value (8.28 to the dollar) would not increase or
decrease more than 0.3% against the value of the dollar."1
Sustaining the peg required that the People's Bank trade a sufficient
amount of U.S. dollars to prevent the Rmb from accumulating against the
dollar and vice versa. 12 That aggregation and alienation of the American
currency anchored the reference exchange rate despite changing
economic factors that would normally cause the Rmb's value to fluctuate
if the currency were floated.' 1 3 At the installation of the fixed exchange
rate, the Rmb's value was nearly equivalent to its actual market value; in
recent years, however, changes in economic conditions would have
caused the currency's value to appreciate if it were determined by the

102. Id.; see also International Economics, HistoricalExchange Rate Regime of Asian
(last
Countries, http://intl.econ.cukh.edu.hk/exchange-rate-regime/index.php?cid=8
visited Jan. 27, 2007) [hereinafter HistoricalExchange Rate].

103. HistoricalExchange Rate, supra note 102 (citing the World Currency Yearbook,
1986-1987, 171).
104.
105.

Id.
Id.

106. Id.; see also Morrison & Labonte, supra note 9, at 1 n. 1. Market swap rate is
used primarily for trade transactions. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 9, at 1 n. 1.
107. HistoricalExchange Rate, supra note 102. See also Morrison & Labonte, supra
note 9, at I n. 1. Prior to reunification, the official exchange rate was approximately 5.8
yuan to the dollar and market swap rate was 8.7 yuan to the dollar. Morrison & Labonte,
supra note 9, at 1 n. 1.
108. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 9, at 1.
109. Id.
110.
111.

Id.
Keith Bradsher, China Loosens Limits on TradingAgainst Other Currenciesbut

Keeps Rein on Dollar,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2005, at C6.
112. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 9, at ].
113.

Id.
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How Other Countries React to the Peg

The peg influences the Rmb's value against the value of other world
currencies. Many East Asian nations intervene in the foreign exchange
market to preempt substantial fluctuations between the values of their
currencies and the value of the Rmb.1 5 Like the People's Bank, those
nations manage their currencies by buying and selling enough U.S.
dollars so that the value of their respective currency is kept artificially
low relative to the value of the dollar.' 16 To maintain the Rmb's
equilibrium against its East Asian counterparts, the PBOC must also
accumulate these countries' currencies along with the dollar." 7
China's Mounting Foreign Exchange Reserves

2.

The net effect of China's intervention in the currency market is that
the country's foreign exchange reserve has risen dramatically in recent
years. In 1999, the People's Bank had a forex reserve of approximately
$154.7 billion. 18 By 2005, however, that amount grew to a stunning
$840 billion." 9 With that1 increase,
China is now the second largest
20
holder of foreign currencies.
3.

Dispute Regarding the Peg's Economic Impact

The Chinese government contended that the purpose of the dollarRmb coupling was not to promote a trade advantage.1 21 According to
officials, the peg preempted significant fluctuations in the Rmb's value
that would have surely destabilized China's domestic economy., 22 A
fully convertible Rmb would lead to escalated speculative pressures in
the currency markets that a fledgling Chinese banking system could not

114. Id. at 2.
115. Id.
116. Sanford, supra note 18, at 3.
117. Id.
118. U.S. China Economic and Security Commission, The China Currency Exchange
Problem: Facts and Policy Options (May 9, 2005), http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/
2005/05 05 09currency-exchange-rate.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007) [hereinafter The
China CurrencyExchange Rate Problem].
119. Sanford, supra note 18, at 3. In December 2004, the PBOC's forex reserves
were $610 billion. 2004 U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM'N ANN. REP. [hereinafter
ANN. REP. 2004].

120.

ANN. REP. 2004, supra note 119.

121.
122.

Sanford, supra note 18, at 1.
Id.
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have sustained, because of its heavy debt burden. 123 They buttressed that
claim by pinpointing the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis as an omen of
what happens when poorly regulated banking systems merge with
convertible currencies.' 24 Besides, eliminating the fixed exchange rate
during the Asian nation's transition from predominantly state-owned25
enterprises would have been detrimental to China's export industries.
Furthermore, political stability would be jeopardized,126 because
dismantling the peg would cause the Rmb to appreciate. 27 Hence, the
inescapable consequences of dismantling the peg would have been
28
deflation, rising unemployment, depressed wages, and worker unrest. 1
Opponents of the fixed-exchange policy view the issue otherwise.
It is the U.S., they allege, that is seriously threatened. 129 The dollar-Rmb
attachment harms America's manufacturing industry. 30 The textiles,
apparel, and furniture sectors,' 3 1 primarily, have a difficult time
competing with their low-cost Chinese counterparts in the U.S. and
international markets. 32 Consequently, in order to maintain their
competitiveness, U.S. manufacturers must relocate their operations to
33
foreign countries to take advantage of the inexpensive labor forces.
That relocation along with diminishing demands for American goods
result in lost jobs in the United States. 34 Furthermore, those East Asian
nations 13 1 with exports that are as vulnerable as U.S. exports must
devalue their respective currencies against the dollar in order to keep
their competitive edge. 136 Those devaluations cause additional burden to
the U.S. manufacturing industry.
B.

The 2005 Revaluation
In the face of considerable external pressure, including from the

123. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 9, at 2-3.
124. Id.; see also Jonathan E. Sanford, CRS Report for Congress, China's Currency:
U.S. Options, at 2 (2005).
125. See Morrison & Labonte, supra note 9, at 2.
126. Id. at 3.
127. Id. at 2-3.
128. Id. at 3.
129. See id. at 2.
130. Sanford, supra note 124, at 2.
131. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 9, at 2.
132. Id. at 2.
133. Id. at 6.
134. See generally PRC's Pegged Exchange,supra note 17.
135. There is evidence supporting Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea's intervention in
the currency market to prevent their respective currencies from declining significantly
against the dollar. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 9, at 5.
136. See id. at 2.
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International Monetary Fund 137 ("IMF"), the People's Bank announced a
revaluation of the Rmb on July 21, 2005.138 Although the PBOC
maintained the 0.3% trading band, 139 the revaluation imposed an
immediate increase in the currency's value from approximately 8.28 to
8.11 Rmb to the dollar-an appreciation of approximately 2.1%.140
Additionally, the People's Bank revealed that the value of the Rmb
would be linked to a basket of currencies, instead of just the U.S.
dollar. 14 1 The currencies of China's top trading partners-the U.S.,
European Union, Japan, and South Korea-would dominate the basket,
but the currencies of some of China's lesser trading partners-namely,
Singapore, Malaysia, Russia, Australia, and Canada-would also be
included. 142 Finally, the PBOC confirmed that the basket composition
would be affected by the strength of the trade between China and its
143
trading partners.
IV. U.S. Reaction to the Currency Relationship
U.S. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow applauded the
announcement from the People's Banks about the Rmb's upward
revaluation. Secretary Snow heralded the change as a positive step that
showed that China was committed to allowing market forces to
determine the value of the Rmb. 144 That commitment was a crucial
element in resolving one of the "biggest economic disputes" between the
two governments.145 Despite Snow's optimism, some critics questioned
whether the revaluation was a true reform in Chinese monetary policy or
a token gesture to assuage growing tensions in the U.S. Congress
regarding the effect that the currency peg has upon the bilateral trade
deficit. 146 The concerns of the critics appeared to be more in line with
reality as the Rmb's value against the dollar only appreciated by a
meager 0.16% by October of 2005.147
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140. Bradsher, supra note 111.
141. Goodman, supra note 139.
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at C4.
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The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on
China

Congress established the U.S. China Economic and Security Review
149
148
Commission ("Commission") upon granting PNTR status to China.
One of the Commission's objectives is to evaluate the implications of the
U.S.-China bilateral trade and economic 15relationship,1 50 including
China's compliance with its WTO obligations.'
Recently, the Commission acknowledged that for the most part,
China had made efforts consistent with its WTO commitments. 152 It,
however, cited the dollar-Rmb peg as one deficiency that U.S. officials
should find problematic. 153 One reason for concern relates to certain
immediate and long-term impact that an undervalued Rmb will have on
154
the U.S. economy--effects that may be uncorrectable in the future.
U.S. corporations move American jobs to China in order to take an
advantage of the low-cost labor force; 155 those jobs may never-be
replaced, and American workers are sure to bear the negative
consequences of that lOSS.156 Another critical reason is that the
overwhelming trade deficit may result in a sudden loss of confidence in
the dollar and other U.S. financial assets, both domestically and
abroad.15758 If that were to occur, U.S. interest rates would surely
increase. 1
In a 2005 report, the Commission discredited persistent claims by
59
the Chinese government that the country's global surplus was minimal. 1
Instead, the Commission suggested that China's figures were
untrustworthy, because the government frequently underreported its
16
0
surplus with the U.S. and its other top forty-three trading partners.
Even if the Asian nation's trade numbers were combined with those of
Hong Kong, the Commission charged that the $58 billion dollar surplus
that China reported with the U.S. is still less than one-half of the $119.3
148. When Congress established the Commission in October 2000, its official name
was the United States-China Security Review Commission. In February 2003, the
Commission's name was amended to include "Economic and." 22 U.S.C. § 7002 (2005).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See ANN. REP. 2004, supra note 119.
153. The China CurrencyExchange Rate Problem, supra note 118.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160.

Id.
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billion that the U.S. Department of Commerce recorded.161
V.

Taking Control of the Bilateral Trade Deficit

Adding to the Commission's concerns, the Bureau of Economic
Analysis reported that the collective U.S. trade imbalance has resulted in
rapidly escalating obligations to foreign investors. 162 International
central banks finance seventy-five percent of the aggregate U.S. trade
deficit, 163 of which approximately 23.3% represented the 2004 trade
imbalance with China.' 64 Consequently, from 1982 to 2004, the United
States' net international investment position 165 declined sharply. 166 That
deterioration-attributable to the sale of assets required to finance the
trade imbalance-moved the U.S. from the strongest
international asset67
holding position to the largest liability standing. 1
A.

Actions that Have Been Proposed

Several members of Congress have individually or collectively
proposed legislation to impose tariffs on all Chinese imports into the
U.S. 168 In a May 2005 report, the Commission recommended that such
levies were viable. 169 Although the impact of a tariff imposition would
be relatively immediate, there are disadvantages to this proposal;' 70 the
chief among them is the WTO's expressed prohibition against such
tariffs. Therefore, if this strategy were instituted, the U.S. would violate
its obligations under its WTO agreement.
Alternatively, the U.S.-through its executive branch-may petition
the IMF for relief under that organization's currency manipulation
161.
162.

ANN. REP. 2004, supra note 119.

Robert E. Scott, Foreign Liabilities are Rapidly Increasing, Especially to

Foreign Central Banks, Economic Snapshots (Jun. 30, 2005), http://www.epinet.org/
content.cfn?id=2056 (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
163. Id.
164. The China Currency Exchange Rate Problem, supra note 118.
165. Net international investment position, measured as a share of the total gross
domestic product, is the value of American-owned assets abroad in excess of the value of
assets owned by foreign entities in the United States. Scott, supra note 162.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Most notable is the proposal by senators Charles E. Schumer and Lindsey 0.
Graham, which would impose a 27.5% tariff on all Chinese imports. The tariff amount
would compensate for the purported discrepancy in cost resulting from the fixed
exchange rate. S. 295, 109th Cong. (2005).
169. The China Currency Exchange Rate Problem, supra note 118.
170. The two disadvantages, the Commission identified in its report were the
increased costs of Chinese products to the U.S. consumer and the possibility of Chinese
retaliation. Presumably, because China can hardly afford a trade war with the U.S., it
would bring action in the WTO, which the Commission asserts would force the issue
before the organization. Id.
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proscription. The problem that arises from this proposal is that the U.S.
Treasury in its 2005 International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies
Report17 ' determined that the actions of the People's Bank did not meet
the IMF's threshold for currency manipulation.'1 2 Therefore, this option
may not be viable.
B.

A Revised Currency Arrangement

A more prudent approach to either of those recommendations would
be for the United States to pressure China to revise the currency basket to
which the value of the Rmb is attached. In June 2005, Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan advocated that it was time for the Rmb
to be detached from the dollar. 173 Because of the trade surplus enjoyed
by China over the U.S., 174 and its rapid overall growth, it would not be
unreasonable to require the former to implement a more flexible
exchange rate, like other large economies. China now has the fourth
largest world economy, 175 and such a strategy would also allow China to
protect its interest by adjusting monetary and fiscal policies as needed.
In its July 2005 announcement, the People's Bank confirmed that
the currencies in the new basket were from countries that had bilateral
trade with China ranging from $5 billion to $10 billion. 76 According to
the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics, that would include as much as
171. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 requires the Treasury
Secretary to conduct yearly analyses of the exchange rate policies of foreign countries to
determine if countries are manipulating the rate of exchange between their currency and
the U.S. dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payment adjustments or
gaining a competitive advantage in international economic markets. 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(1996).
172. The International Monetary Fund defines currency manipulation as a large-scale
and protracted intervention in one direction to gain an unfair trade advantage.
Additionally, the organization's Principles for Guidance of Members' Exchange Rate
Policies mandate that member nations shall refrain from manipulating exchange rates or
the international monetary system to gain unfair competitive advantage over other
members unless such action is intended to prevent short-term disruptions in currency
values and a member nation intervening in exchange rates must consider the impact the
Morris Goldstein, Currency
intervention will have on other member nations.
Manipulation and Enforcing the Rules of the InternationalMonetary System, at 3 (2005),
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/goldstein0905imf.pdf(last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
173. China: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement
at
available
Reserve),
Federal
Chairman,
Greenspan,
of
Alan
(last
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2005/20050623/default.htm)
visited Jan. 27, 2007).
174. See generallyTrade in Goods, supra note 3.
175. Keith Bradsher, China Reports Another Year of Strong (or Even Better) Growth,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, C5. China's economy ranks fourth behind the economies of
the U.S., Japan, and Germany. Id.
176. Economic Letter from Mark M. Spiegel, Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, at 2 (Sept. 9, 2005), http://www.frbsf.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).

2007]

DOLLARS

& RENMINBIS

77
twenty-two other nations with sixty-nine percent of China's total trade.
The problem with that large basket is that several of the countries that are
included are those of countries that also tie their respective currency to
the dollar. 178 Primarily for that reason, such a large currency basket must
be rejected as inadequate.
Instead, America should encourage China to narrow the basket to
include only the currencies of the latter's three largest trade partners, i.e.,
the U.S., European Union, and Japan. 179 Obviously, any adverse impact
suffered from the dollar by the three-currency basket could be lessened.
In three different hypothetical scenarios, Mark Spiegel, Vice President of
the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank, demonstrated that if the Rmb
had been based on the twenty-two nation basket from 2001 to 2005 it
would have appreciated between nine and eleven percent over its preJuly 2005 value. 180 Presumably, the appreciation could be much more
significant if a narrower currency basket were implemented.
Another advantage of this recommendation is that as the value of
the Rmb increases, there would be less incentive to link other East Asian
currencies to the dollar. That result would minimize the risk posed to the
U.S. currency by not having those less stable economies so highly
invested in U.S. assets.' 8'
Consequently, once those East Asian
currencies are unencumbered from the dollar, the true value of the U.S.
currency would be reflected. U.S. consumers would be forced to pay
more for Chinese imports because the real cost of those goods will
become evident. The long-term and significant advantage then would be
the potential to stem the demand for those products. 182 As a result,
domestically manufactured products would be more able to compete
against those imports. Moreover, the cost of U.S. exports in China
would also become more competitive against domestically manufactured

177.
178.

Id.
See id. at 2; see also Morrison & Labonte, supra note 9, at 5.

179. China's Exchange Rate Regime: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Dom. &
Int'l Monetary Policy, Trade, & Tech., H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 108th Cong., at 4 (2003)

(testimony of Morris Goldstein, Dennis Weatherstone Senior Fellow, Inst. for Int'l Econ.)
[hereinafter Goldstein].
180. In his first hypothetical, Spiegel uses a fifteen-nation currency basket based on
China's $10 billion trading partners, which resulted in an eleven percent appreciation. In
the second, a twenty-two nation basket is created based on trading partners that are equal
to or greater than $5 billion, which resulted in a ten percent appreciation. In the final
scenario, Hong Kong is added to the second hypothetical, which resulted in a nine
percent appreciation; it should be noted that the third scenario is unacceptable because, as
the author noted, Hong Kong's currency is closely pegged to that of the U.S. Spiegel,
supra note 176, at 2-3.
181. See generally PRC's PeggedExchange,supranote 17.
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PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:3

products in the Asian nation.183
1.

Gradual Appreciation of the Rrnb's Value

Likewise, the United States should encourage the People's Bank to
raise the value of the Rmb once the three-currency basket system is
adopted. Economists have debated that a gradual increase can range
from a modest three to five percent1 84 to a more aggressive ten to twenty
percent 8 5 on a semi-annual or annual basis. Behind the skepticism of
whether, if at all, an increase in the Rmb's value should be implemented
are concerns regarding the pressure that might be placed on the Chinese
economy.' 86
In spite of that anxiety, adopting the higher range appears to be
more desirable. 187 Such an increase amounts to China's annual inflow of
direct foreign investments of approximately $50 billion, or four percent
of its gross domestic product. 188 There is agreement that if a greater
appreciation of the Rmb were to occur, the results would not be
detrimental because the Chinese economy would not suffer significantly
from running a current account deficit. 89 Further, because the Rmb
would still be pegged to major world currencies and not fully
convertible, it would have some protection. Additional safeguards that
might be afforded are that the increases would be periodic; hence, the
upward revaluations would be easier for the PBOC to manage against
any perceived market threats.
The proposal of the People's Bank to allow the Rmb to fluctuate
only within 0.3% of the new currency basket' 90 should be held
unsatisfactory. As the governor of the People's Bank stated, the July
revaluation should not be regarded as an indication that there would be
similar appreciations in the future. 191 For a decade, however, China has
benefited from a stable Rmb-mostly at the expense of the U.S. dollarwhile other world currencies have withstood the worst of the global
currency market. 92 The U.S. should not permit that practice by the
183.
184.

Id.
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CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 12, 2005, at 17.
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PBOC to persist-particularly in light of the robust growth of the
Chinese economy-and should urge the Asian nation to implement a
broader fluctuation range.
In addition, there is room for leniency in this approach because it
provides a more desirable opportunity to maintain the Rmb's stability.
Instead of the meager 0.3% proposal, the People's Bank should employ a
five to seven percent fluctuation range around the currency basket central
parity as recommended by some economists. 193 Another viable option
would be for the People's Bank to establish an undisclosed target range
(with a low end set at least four percent). 94 Such a strategy would
protect the Rmb from currency speculators whose hedging could result in
destabilization.' 95 Nondisclosure of the target range is not an unusual
practice because it is widely used by other Asian nations, like
Singapore,
96
threats.'
perceived
similar
against
currencies
their
to protect
2.

Proceeding with Caution

The U.S. must approach this policy with much diplomacy. As of
December 31, 2004, China's foreign exchange reserve was second
largest in the world only behind Japan, 197 while the United States is the
world's largest debtor.' 98 Therefore, that should be cause for concern to
the U.S.
In February 2005, the dollar fell sharply after the South Korean
central bank announced that it would start purchasing less U.S. dollars in
favor of the euro and other investments. 199 That revelation led to
speculation that if the South Korea announcement could cause that
impact, a similar move by China may be more catastrophic. 0 0 Such an
event could be the United States' worst economic nightmare. Should
China stop investing in U.S. debt instruments and start to diversify into
other foreign currency reserves, the consequence to the U.S. economy
would be massive because of America's elevated national debt. 0 '
The reaction to the South Korean announcement portends the
193. Goldstein, supra note 179.
194. Barry Eichengreen, China Should Unpeg the Remninbi (sic) Now, at 5 (2003),
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/-eichengr/reviews/swissreviewl 3aug5-03.pdf (last visited
Jan. 27, 2007).
195. Id.
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http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/22/markets/bondcenter/bonds/(last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
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economic vulnerability of the U.S. The longer the American government
allows the People's Bank to accrue the dollar in an effort to protect the
Rmb, the more detrimental the consequences could be for the American
economy. The U.S. should act accordingly to curtail this practice.
C.

Standing Under the WTO Agreements

Based upon this premise, the U.S. has a viable cause against China
for the latter's violation of its WTO obligations. As WTO members, the
U.S. may seek recourse against China under the organization's dispute
resolution system. Because the PBOC's currency arrangement decreases
the cost of Chinese imports into the U.S. and increases the cost of U.S.
exports, it is debatable whether the peg acts like a subsidy to Chinese
importers. Based upon that assertion, the U.S. has an argument that
China is in violation of its WTO obligation.
Furthermore, the WTO Agreement has guidelines for how its
member nations should treat their currencies in order to afford some
measure of fairness in the international exchange market. Section IV of
Article XV of the Agreement forbids contracting parties from frustrating,
via currency intervention, "the intent of the provisions of [the]
Agreement, [or] by trade action, the intent of the provisions
of the
20 2
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.,
D.

U.S. v. China in the World Trade Organization

Since its entry into the WTO, the U.S. and China have faced off
only once before the organization's dispute resolution panel. In March
2004, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a case against China
regarding the Asian nation's seventeen percent value-added tax ("VAT")
levied against U.S. exports of integrated circuits.2 °3 The U.S. argued that
the Chinese government taxed compatible semiconductors that were
manufactured domestically in the Asian nation at a relatively minimal
rate of three percent. 204 After several rounds of negotiations before the
WTO panel, which lasted about four months, the two nations entered into
an agreement whereby China would immediately cease to offer this
advantage to new designers of semiconductors that were domestically
based. 20 5 Additionally, by April 1, 2005, the practice would terminate
202. World Trade Organization, WTO Agreement, art. XV, § 4.
203. Press Release, The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. and China
Resolve WTO Dispute Regarding China's Tax on Semiconductors (July 8, 2004),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressRelease/2004/July/
USChinaResolve. . . (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
204. Id.
205. Id.
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completely.2 °6
As a result of this case, the U.S. government should feel confident
that it can prevail in a legitimate case brought against China. As
previously stated, the currency arrangement functions much like a
subsidy; therefore, it parallels the trade disadvantages of the VAT in the
semiconductor dispute.
VI. Conclusion
The U.S. has seen its trade deficit with China explode over the past
twenty years. During that period, the Asian nation has become the
United States' largest trading partner. Although China contends that it
competes fairly against the United States in international and reciprocal
trade, the evidence demonstrates otherwise. In fact, it reveals that the
long-standing dollar-Rmb peg that the People's Bank of China has
maintained spurs China's trade surplus with the United States. This
problem is further exacerbated now that China is a member of the WTO
and has complete and free access to the U.S. markets.
In order to combat this increasing disadvantage, the U.S. must
compel the Chinese government to live up to the obligations it assumed
upon its recent accession to the WTO. To accomplish this outcome, the
U.S. must demand that the People's Bank of China revalue the Rmb and
adopt a more equitable managed currency system. That should serve to
protect the U.S. and Chinese domestic economies.
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